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Reviewed by PEm HAY*
The Unhinged Alliance is a thoughtful, insightful and often
disturbing account of America's relationship with the European
Community. Its author, the former U.S. Ambassador to the
European Communities, writes from the vantage of his diplomatic
post and more than ten years' service as Deputy Assistant Secre-
tary of State; he has an extraordinary grasp of the many issues -
political, economic and military - which face, and beset, the
Alliance.
This "policy book," written for the Council on Foreign Re-
lations, details the many blunders and misguided policies on both
sides of the Atlantic - unhappily, however, mainly American.
For example, two short pages present the simple arithmetic that
the European defense contribution is roughly equivalent to our
own, despite the American myth and perennial Congressional
rumblings (and accompanying threats of cutbacks) to the con-
trary. The Trade Act of 1974 comes in for severe criticism: "a
materialistic piece of legislation with a clear bias against the
GATT," the "new knife - all blade,... could be used to cut
duties, or to cut imports." While Congress receives some credit,
despite the defection of organized labor "from the ranks of liberal
trade," for not trying "to deal with the worst economic crisis
since the 1930's with the traditional rain dance of new barriers
against imports," Mr. Schaetzel also points to the obvious Ameri-
can (and European) footdragging with respect to new inter-
national trade negotiations. Both sides still retain a battery of
nontarifl barriers against each other (and third countries), com-
bined, in the case of Europe, with the negative effect on American
trade of the Community's "Common Agricultural Policy" and,
in the case of the United States, with restrictions ranging from
"dairy quotas to the disingenuously named 'voluntary' steel and
textile agreements."
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Mr. Schaetzel wisely recognizes the effect of eroded foreign
policy during the Nixon years, and the resultant skepticism on
the part of the American public toward Euro-American coopera-
tion, especially in economic sectors. Withdrawal of the previously
strong American support for political and financial unification
led to a real deterioration in European-American relations, color-
ing all American foreign policy since and abruptly changing
American focus to other areas of the world, most recently the
U.S.R.R., China, and the Middle East. Mr. Schaetzel's major
concern is the atmosphere of suspicion and distrust regarding
economic matters which has pervaded all American-European
negotiation since the Nixon era.
The author reserves his most severe criticism for the Nixon-
Rogers and Nixon-Kissinger conduct of our political relations with
the European Community. 'From President Nixon's refusal to
receive Commission President Rey in 1969, after he had issued
a formal invitation for a visit to Washington, to Alastair Buchan's
statement quoted from the 1973 Reith lectures which for Schaetzel
points out the dangers of personalized diplomacy and the necessity
for some institutionalization of foreign policy ("Kissinger ...
may perceive that the best to which he can put his reputation...
will not be to reorganize the world, but to lay the foundations of
reform that would give greater confidence in the consistency of
an American foreign policy-.. ."), the book details both the
American neglect of its European relations and our lack of sensi-
tivity in pursuing and pressing those policies which did emerge.
To be sure, American diplomatic relations are made more difficult
by the delicate distribution of power within the European Com-
munity among the national governments of the Member States,
the Community's political power center (the Council of Min-
isters), and its administration and bureaucracy (the Commission).
Because the United States is represented both in national capitals
and by a special mission in Brussels, and because the Community's
mission in Washington exists side by side with nine national
missions, coordination of diplomatic contacts and relationships is
difficult indeed. The solution of the Nixon administration -
largely to bypass the Commission (and the U.S. diplomatic mission
to the Commission) in favor of direct contact with "France,
Britain, and Germany, in that order" - undermined the Com-
mission's position: ".... denied the most elementary trappings
of government, [it] is regarded as the poor relation both by the
member governments and by Washington."
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But direct diplomatic relations with the Member States did
not work well either, for "Nixon exceeded his predecessors in that
distinctive American practice of placing in ambassadorial posi-
tions men whose only visible qualification was financial loyalty
to the party." Small wonder, then, that "[w]hen Kissinger and
the White House became interested in an issue, American officials
[professionals and political appointees alike] would be cut out."
The result of mismanaged and personality-centered diplomatic
relations with Europe is, in Mr. Schaetzel's words, that "[t]he
Nixon-Kissinger era has left to future administrations a heritage
of priorities, prejudices and style which limits their maneuver-
ability." Well-conceived, and succinctly stated, remedies include
the strengthening of the position of the American diplomatic
representative to the Commission, a rethinking of the role of
American missions in national capitals of Community members,
and increased, formalized dialogues on the bureaucratic and cabi-
net level between American and Community (Commission and
Council) government officials. Mr. Schaetzel appears hopeful that
the more open Ford administration may move toward these
remedies, but as recent events have demonstrated, the continued
dominance of the Secretary of State may weaken this hope.
In some instances, Mr. Schaetzel's criticisms seem too sweep-
ing, especially in his evaluation of the European institutions and
policies. Thus, his view of the Commission still contains under-
tones of the stereotype that it is a technocracy; he gives it too
little credit for genuine achievements despite the undisputed fact
that political power lies with the Council. The Court of Justice,
despite its singular achievement of elaborating (and gaining
national judicial and political acceptance for) the doctrine of
"directly applicable" and preemptive (in the sense of our federal
Supremacy Clause) Community law, receives but a one-paragraph
mention. An evaluation of the integrative process should give
the Court far more emphasis.
Mr. Schaetzel is also critical of the Community's association
policies which, to him, "have nearly reached their limits," have
undermined GATT, and have created trade preferences instead
of (desirable) free trade. No express mention is made of the
Lom6 Convention of early 1975 by which the Community re-
structured a number of its association agreements and provided
an overall framework for the association of 46 African, Caribbean
and Pacific states, virtually all developing nations. With associa-
tions of such global nature, one might argue that, rather than
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representing discriminatory preferential systems, these relation-
ships are not only a meaningful manner in which to render foreign
assistance; they also achieve something developing nations have
long sought from GATT and industrial nations individually,
but - except for Australia - so far have not received: recognition
that the status of "developing nation" makes the application of
traditional free-trade and most-favored-nation principles inappro-
priate. The latter are enshrined in GATT, but GATI began as
the industrialized world's very own club.
The Community has moved slowly to meeting third-world
needs, for instance in the form of unilateral preferences; even the
Trade Act of 1974, despite all the justified criticism one may
levy against it, takes a first few halting steps in that direction.
In view of this, the Community policy should perhaps become an
example of how third-world problems may be addressed and re-
dressed, rather than being placed on the agenda for disman-
tlement.
These minor criticisms apart, Mr. Schaetzel's book is a singu-
larly balanced and thoughtful achievement. Extremely readable,
insightful and wide-ranging in the policy problems it raises and
the changes in thinking it suggests, the book deserves the widest
audience.
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